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Abstract
The aim of the present paper is to empirically estimate the mon-
etary value workers place on safer working conditions. The marginal
willingness to pay for workplace safety is estimated using data on
job durations together with data on accident risks and wages. The
results indicate that individuals value safety to 0.65-4.1 percent of an-
nual wages. Male workers in service occupations are found to have the
highest marginal willingness to pay. Female blue-collar workers are
found to value workplace safety higher than male blue-collar workers.
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1 Introduction
The analysis in the present paper attempts to quantify the monetary value
of reducing the risk of on-the-job accidents by focusing on workers' pref-
erences. Do workers themselves have a positive willingness to pay for in-
creases in workplace safety? Hazardous working conditions and their e®ects
on worker health continue to be an important issue for public policy and
the work to reduce working hazards is an ongoing concern. In Sweden,
almost 8 out of 1,000 workers1 su®ered injuries causing a loss of workdays
in 2006. Risk reduction measures are costly. It is important to quantify the
monetary value on the marginal bene¯ts of accident risk reduction, which
can be contrasted with the costs of workplace risk reduction measures.
Earlier research have focused mainly on the value of life, i.e. the mone-
tary value of reducing accidents with a fatal outcome. However, the mon-
etary value of non-fatal accidents is also important as accidents can have
debilitating and life-changing e®ects for the individual worker.
To estimate the individual willingness to pay for workplace safety, work-
ers are considered to change jobs during their working life whenever they
are o®ered a job with better work conditions. Here, work conditions are
de¯ned as earnings and other job characteristics, such as workplace safety.
Using information on work histories obtained from the Swedish Level of
Living Survey in 1991, the e®ect of job characteristics on time spent on a
job are estimated. Marginal willingness to pay estimates can then be ob-
tained by using the marginal e®ects of di®erent job characteristics on the
hazard rate, as pointed out by Gronberg and Reed (1984).
Previous research regarding the valuation of workplace safety has fo-
cused on estimating hedonic wage functions. In that framework, workers
require wage compensation in order to accept a risky job. All other things
equal, a higher risk level is coupled with a higher wage (Viscusi, 1992). The
main criticism of this approach, as has been pointed out by Viscusi (1992),
Garen (1988) and Hwang et al. (1992) among others, is the di±culty to
1All industries. National Board of Occupational Safety and Health (2008)2
observe all relevant characteristics of workers and ¯rms. Since safety can
be considered a normal good it can be expected that workers with higher
human capital could possibly select jobs with both higher wages and better
working conditions. Hwang et al. (1992) show that if it is not possible to
observe workers human capital, estimates of the compensating di®erential
will be biased. The size of this bias can be substantial and may even result
in parameter estimates with unexpected signs (Hwang et al., 1992). In a
recent paper using Norwegian data, Dale-Olsen (2006) found that search
frictions cause a sizeable downward bias when estimating the marginal will-
ingness to pay using a hedonic wage framework.
In the present paper, workers do not necessarily change to a job with
higher wages and lower risk. The improvement in wages could be su±cient
to o®set an increase in risk when estimating the marginal willingness to pay
for workplace safety in a search context. By using data on job spells the
e®ect of wages on job durations, and hence on the probability of leaving a
job, is separated from the probability of leaving due to hazardous working
conditions.
A °exible speci¯cation for job durations is applied here. Job durations
are considered to be generalized gamma distributed. The speci¯cation also
allows variables to vary with time and parameters to vary across groups.
The results suggest that workers tend to stay longer in jobs with lower
risk rates and higher wages. The average marginal willingness to pay for
workplace safety is SEK 415, which is 0.65 percent of annual wages, when
workplace safety is measured as the reduction in the number of accidents
by 1/1000 employees. When allowing MWP estimates to vary across sub-
groups, only blue-collar workers and males in service occupations have pos-
itive and signi¯cant e®ects of risk on expected duration. Blue-collar female
workers are on average willing to forego a larger part of their wages to
increase workplace safety, 1.32 percent compared to 0.93 percent for male
blue-collar workers. The highest MWP estimates are for male workers in
service occupations. They are willing to give up on average SEK 1,703 (4.13
percent of wages) to reduce the number of workplace accidents by 1/1,000
employees.
The outline of the study is as follows. Section 2 describes a model
of job-to-job transitions. Data are presented in Section 3, while Section
4 describes the econometric method. Section 5 contains the results while
Section 6 concludes.
2 A Model of Job Transitions
Consider a labor market, with imperfections in the sense that workers can
not freely choose among jobs, with di®erent wages and nonpecuniary at-
tributes. The current employment is not only a matter of choice, but it also
depends on the arrival of job o®ers. Dissatisfaction with the present job
induces workers to search for new jobs to improve their wages and working
conditions. Workers will be sorted into employment and unemployment
depending on market opportunities. If the o®ered job is better than the
current job, in terms of o®ering a higher utility, the worker is observed to
change jobs, otherwise the o®er is rejected and the worker continues with
the present job and continues to search. The utility from a job is here
considered to depend on wages as well as nonpecuniary job attributes, for
instance workplace safety.2
The focus is here on modeling the probability of a worker leaving the
current job for a new job. The value to a worker of having a speci¯c
job can at each instant be summarized by a utility function where the
arguments consist of wages and a vector of nonpecuniary job attributes.
This instantaneous utility in the present job can be written as u(w;z).
Workers are assumed to receive job o®ers that are random draws from
the joint distribution of wages, w, and nonpecuniary attributes, z, with
distribution function F(u(w;z)). Each new job o®er arrives according to a
2The standard search framework has been extensively described. See, e.g., Rogerson
et al. (2005) for an extensive survey of search-theoretic models of the labor market and
Eckstein and van den Berg (2007) for a survey of empirical applications of search theory.4
Poisson process.
The probability of quitting is given by the product of the probability
of receiving a new o®er, ±, and the probability that the o®ered job yields
a higher utility than the present job, 1 ¡ F(u(w;z)). This transition rate
from a job can be written
¸(u(w;z)) = ±[1 ¡ F(u(w;z))]: (1)
The transition rate is then the product of a chance element, i.e. the prob-
ability of receiving a new job o®er, and a choice element, which is the
probability that the worker ¯nds the new job better than the current one.
In the basic on-the-job search model the Poisson process generating the
job o®ers is assumed to be time-inhomogeneous. The arrival of new job
o®ers is not dependent on time spent in employment. The process has
no memory and each new job o®er is independent of all previous o®ers.
Additionally, if the distribution of wage o®ers is constant we have a sta-
tionary model of job search. The transition rate is then constant implying
exponentially distributed employment spells.
However, a constant transition rate is restrictive. It could very well be
that ± and/or F(w;z) change with time. This will result in a non-stationary
transition rate. It has been shown that a non-stationary transition rate will
arise in a number of di®erent settings, for instance if the reservation wage
depends on time (Mortensen, 1986; Jovanovich, 1984), or if there are e®ects
of learning, changes in the cost of search, and changes in the availability of
job o®ers (Lancaster, 1990). van den Berg (1990) analyzed a non-stationary
model where the utility of unemployment in the present state, the arrival
rate of job o®ers, and the wage o®er distribution are allowed to vary over
time. In a non-stationary model of job search the transition rate from
job-to-job is given by
¸(u(w;z);t) = ±(t)[1 ¡ F(u(w;z)jt)]; (2)
where either or both the probability of receiving a new o®er and the in-
stantaneous utility now depend on time.5
The transition rate can yield information about workers monetary eval-
uation of di®erent nonpecuniary job attributes. The marginal willingness
to pay for job attributes is given by the marginal utility of the job attribute
divided by the marginal utility of wages. As pointed out by Gronberg and
Reed (1984), this will equal the marginal e®ect of the job attribute on the









where w is wages and zk is one of k = 1;2;:::;K non-wage attributes. In
a paper by van Ommeren et al. (2000), the validity of Eq.(3) is considered
for a number of extensions to the basic search model. They show that
the result presented by Gronberg and Reed (1984) will hold in a general
model of on-the-job search. Eq. (3) can also be shown to be time-invariant
for the generalized gamma family of distributions used in this paper (see
Appendix).
3 The Sample and the Variables
Information on employment histories is obtained from the retrospective
questions of the 1991 Swedish Level of Living Survey. Individuals are asked
about their work experience. All persons that have had, at least, one job
lasting six months or more are interviewed about their complete employ-
ment history. Besides employment there is information on the following
activities: unemployment, education, military service, parental leave, and
self-employment. In all, there are complete employment histories for 3,624
individuals. The earliest spell started in 1931 and the latest began in 1991.
Durations are measured in months.
The interest here is in the e®ects of di®erent variables on the probabil-
ity of changing jobs. The initial sample of job spells consists of a total of
13,406 observations. Job changes are considered to occur when an individ-
ual changes employer. Only job spells that began after 1970 are included6
Table 1: Sample reduction
Reduction Remaining
Initial sample 13,406
- start year before 1970 4,796 8,610
- missing start/end date 255 8,355
- missing risk 644 7,711
- missing wages 76 7,635
Final sample 7,635
in the analysis due to lack of data on wages before that year. Table 1 gives
a complete description of the reductions of sample size. Not very many
individuals experience 8 spells or more. These spells are all labeled as job
spell 8. The ¯nal sample consist of 7,635 job spells.
Descriptive statistics and variable de¯nitions are given in Table 2. In-
formation on wages is obtained from o±cial tax registers and is matched
to the interview data. Data on wages are available for the years 1970-1991
and are de°ated to the 1991 price level using the Consumer Price Index.
Wages are measured in SEK 1,000s.
The risk of injury is used as a measure of workplace safety, where risk
of injury are all nonfatal injuries reported to the National Board of Occu-
pational Safety and Health. Reported injuries are those which cause lost
workdays. The risk rates are matched to the employment data on the basis
of 5-digit industry codes. The risk rate is the annual number of reported
work accidents per 1,000 employees in each industry. The number of acci-
dents is available for each year 1970-1991. Using industry averages instead
of individual risk data will introduce measurement errors as di®erent types
of workers in each industry most likely face di®erent risks, e.g., adminis-
trative sta® and welders most likely face di®erent risk although employed
in the same industry. The type and severity of injuries may also di®er
both within and across industries. Workers are classi¯ed according to oc-
cupation type in an attempt to control for these factors. Three distinct7
Table 2: Variable description
Variable name Mean St.dev. Description
Job duration 43.96 50.29 duration in months
Wages 104.35 62.83 real annual wages (SEK 1,000s)
Risk of injury 26.80 20.20 accident incidence rate
Excess risk 0.54 0.50 =1 if high risk occupation
Experience 7.03 7.33 work experience in 10's of years
Turnover 5.45 1.14 job turnover manufacturing
Female 0.54 0.50 =1 if female
University 0.07 0.26 =1 if university degree
Small workplace 0.23 0.42 =1 if < 10 workers
Large workplace 2 0.43 0.50 =1 if > 50 workers
Spell 2 0.18 0.38 =1 if worker's 2nd job
Spell 3 0.17 0.38 =1 if worker's 3rd job
Spell 4 0.14 0.35 =1 if worker's 4th job
Spell 5 0.11 0.31 =1 if worker's 5th job
Spell 6 0.08 0.27 =1 if worker's 6th job
Spell 7 0.06 0.23 =1 if worker's 7th job
Spell 8 0.10 0.30 =1 if worker's ¸ 8th job
Censoring indicator 0.65 0.48 =1 if not censored
Job turnover has been multiplied by 100 for computational reasons.
Descriptive statistics are for start year when applicable.
groups are identi¯ed: white-collar workers, blue-collar workers and service
workers. White-collar workers include administrative, executive, sales, and
technical workers as well as doctors and nurses. Blue-collar workers com-
prise production and maintenance sta®. Police and ¯remen, cleaning sta®,
hairdressers are some of the groups considered as service workers.3
Malker (1990) identi¯es a number of occupations as having excess risk
using indirect standardized incidence ratios. The standardized incidence
ratios are given by the number of accidents for each occupation divided
by the expected number of cases, strati¯ed on age cohorts and geographic
region. An indicator variable, excess risk, is created taking the value of
one for the occupations identi¯ed as having a standardized incidence ratio
3White-collar workers (NYK1-NYK339, except NYK42, NYK43, NYK47, NYK48),
blue-collar workers (NYK401-NYK889), and service workers (NYK911-NYK981 and
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Figure 1: Accidents by type (1991: all industries)
larger than one at least one type of injury. 4
As can be seen in Figure 1, the most common type of accident is overex-
ertion of body part, closely followed by fall of person and accidents involving
moving objects. A comparison of risk rates among industries is given in
Figure 2. The number of accidents per 1,000 employees is highest in some
manufacturing sectors, ¯re rescue, and metal ore mining. For the manu-
facturing sectors butcheries and iron and steel works the accident rate is
more than four times as high as the total rate for all industries. The safest
sectors are banking, education, and retail.
The exogenously given probability of receiving a job o®er ± changes over
time as labor market conditions vary. As ± is not known, the rate of job
turnover for Swedish manufacturing for the years 1970-1991 is matched to
the data. Job turnover rates are from a study by Andersson et al. (2000).
For computational reasons this measure is multiplied with 100.
4Other variables indicating severity of accidents were also considered. But neither the
rate of fatal accidents nor duration of sick leave were found to have any signi¯cant e®ect
on the expected employment duration.9
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Figure 2: Risk values for di®erent industries (1991)
More recent values of wages, risk, and turnover are more likely to be
important than values in the starting year. Also, both the probability of
receiving a job o®er and the wage o®er distribution are likely to change
over time. Wages, risk, and turnover are allowed to vary over the course
of a job spell to accommodate this. These variables are updated annually,
while remaining constant during each calendar year. This expansion result
in a data set with 42,317 observations.
A distinction is made between voluntary and involuntary job changes.
All moves to unemployment, retirement, or to an unspeci¯ed activity are
considered to be involuntary. Involuntary job separations are treated as
censored observations since the time the individual would have chosen to
stay is unknown.10
4 Econometric Method
The aim is to estimate the e®ect of risk and wages on the transition rate of
leaving a job in Eq. (2) using data on individuals, each with one or more
employment spells. A general formulation of the transition rate allowing
for multiple spells, time-varying variables as well as left truncation is
h = h(t¤;xm
t ¯;µ) (4)
where h is a function of t¤ = (t0i;ti), conditional on explanatory variables
xm
t , parameters ¯, and distribution speci¯c parameters µ. The variables in
xm
t include wages, w, nonpecuniary job characteristics, z, and other vari-
ables controlling for individual, workplace, as well as labor market charac-
teristics. They may vary with time t and job spell m. Each spell starts at
time t0i and ends at time ti. Left truncation is present as for the ¯rst job
only spells lasting longer than six months are included in the retrospective
survey. Time is measured since the start of each spell.
A parametric approach is used, having the advantage of being more
e±cient than semi-parametric approaches (Cleves et al., 2004). Given the
availability of di®erent distributions, a parametric approach can be very
°exible in allowing for di®erent shapes of the hazard function.
As the retrospective study only covers time until 1991, there are a num-
ber of job spells that are ongoing (censored) at the time of the survey and
for which t¤ is not fully observed. The likelihood contribution (Cleves et al.,








where di is a censoring indicator equal to one for observations that are not
censored. The term in the denominator accounts for truncation.
Durations, t, are considered to be generalized gamma distributed GG(µ),
µ = (¿;¾;·)0. This is a °exible distribution that allows for a variety of
shapes of the hazard function and it contains other common distributions11











1 ¡ ¡(·¡2(e¡¿t)·=¾;·¡2); for · > 0
1 ¡ ©(sgn(·)(ln(t) ¡ ¿)=¾); for · = 0
¡(·¡2(e¡¿t)·=¾;·¡2); for · < 0
(7)
where ¡(b) is the gamma function, ¡(a;b) is the incomplete gamma func-
tion5, and ©(c) is the standard normal distribution.6
In the case of the generalized gamma distribution it is easier to param-
eterize the logarithm of durations, lnt, instead of allowing variables to di-
rectly a®ect the hazard rate. Variables a®ect t such that ¿ = lnt¡º = xm
t ¯,
where º is a random disturbance term. This is the standard accelerated
failure time formulation.7
The transition rate for the generalized gamma distribution can be ob-
tained analytically by dividing Eq. (6) by Eq. (7)), f(t)=S(t). Although the
resulting expression for the transition rate is mathematically cumbersome,
the marginal willingness to pay for reducing the risk of injury can, using
the result in Eq. (3), be shown to be (see appendix A) of the following
simple form
MWPrisk = ¡¯risk=¯w: (8)
To facilitate interpretation the minus sign is added to the MWP expres-
sion. The interpretation will then be as the marginal willingness to pay
for workplace safety and it is the monetary amount workers are willing to
forego in order to get a job with increased safety.
Speci¯cation tests also indicated that the full generalized gamma spec-
i¯cation was found necessary as the model did not collapse into any of
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6See Cox et al. (2007) and Stata Corporation (2003) for this parametrization of the
generalized gamma distribution.
7The model is estimated using the STATA statistical software.12
the models nested within the generalized gamma speci¯cation (log-normal,
Weibull and gamma, respectively).8
The linear speci¯cation of the mean function was questioned and the
inclusion of quadratic terms for risk and wages was tested. For the range of
values that is of interest here, this did not alter parameter estimates. Fur-
ther, the inclusion of quadratic terms lead to a violation of the underlying
utility theory as marginal willingness to pay estimates for workplace safety
were negative for a substantial number of observations.
Due consideration was paid to testing and allowing for heteroskedastic-
ity. Heteroskedasticity will make parameter estimates inconsistent and will
also unpredictably a®ect the power of the t-test. It is not unlikely that vari-
ances di®er across groups. An attempt to test and control for heteroskedas-
ticity is made by allowing some of the explanatory variables to a®ect the
scale parameter ¾, such that the skedastic function is ¾m
t = exp(ym
t °)
(Greene, 2000). When variables enter ¾m
t , the model is no longer an accel-
erated failure time model (Cox et al., 2007).
The MWP estimates will now di®er across spells (see appendix A).
De¯ne a = ·¡2(e¡¿t)·=¾m
t and s = a·¡2
e¡a=
R a
0 v(·¡2¡1)e¡v dv, where ¿ =
xm
t ¯ and ¾m
t = exp(ym
t °). The marginal willingness to pay is given by
MWPrisk = ¡
¾m
t °risk + ·[·¡2 ¡ a ¡ s][(¡¿ + lnt)°risk + ¯risk]
¾m
t °wages + ·[·¡2 ¡ a ¡ s][(¡¿ + lnt)°wages + ¯wages]
:
(9)
Each job spell will have a separate value of the marginal willingness to pay
calculated for the ¯nal year of each spell.
5 Empirical Results
The estimation results are shown in Table 3. The ¯ parameters are trans-
formed to show the percentage change in expected duration t of a unit
8Attempts to test for unobserved heterogeneity by including a heterogeneity term
were unsuccessful as the estimation did not converge.13
Table 3: Estimation results (percentage changes in t)
I II
Wages 0.74 (16.95)
Wages-wc, m, u 0.48 (4.10)
Wages-wc, m, nu 0.70 (9.65)
Wages-wc, f, u 0.47 (3.90)
Wages-wc, f, nu 0.60 (8.60)
Wages-bc, m 0.94 (13.75)
Wages-bc, f 0.94 (8.64)
Wages-s, m 0.99 (7.79)
Wages-s, f 0.70 (8.17)
Risk -0.18 (-2.09)
Risk-wc, m, u 0.67 (0.87)
Risk-wc, m, nu -0.10 (-0.40)
Risk-wc, f, u 0.17 (0.26)
Risk-wc, f, nu 0.18 (1.04)
Risk-bc, m -0.40 (-3.16)
Risk-bc, f -0.71 (-3.26)
Risk-s, m -1.45 (-2.17)
Risk-s, f -0.19 (-0.45)
Excess risk -7.13 (-2.08) -10.55 (-2.36)
Turnover -12.38 (-7.79) -12.25 (-7.57)
Experience 11.53 (19.19) 11.36 (18.78)
Female 6.76 (1.67) 17.30 (1.44)
University degree -10.76 (-1.68) 12.25 (0.66)
Small workplace -12.23 (-3.06) -12.67 (-3.18)
Large Workplace 13.78 (3.10) 12.67 (2.86)
Job spell 2 -24.06 (-5.82) -23.44 (-5.66)
Job spell 3 -28.78 (-6.38) -28.40 (-6.31)
Job spell 4 -43.50 (-10.44) -43.12 (-10.28)
Job spell 5 -46.53 (-10.59) -46.26 (-10.43)
Job spell 6 -46.17 (-9.13) -46.21 (-8.75)
Job spell 7 -49.36 (-8.23) -48.89 (-8.04)
Job spell 8 -67.02 (-20.35) -65.90 (-19.20)
Constant 2.92 (21.00) 3.04 (21.36)
ln ¾ Details in Table A-1 in Appendix
· -0.208 (-4.08) -0.213 (-4.00)
Pseudo log-L -10,226.684 -10,192.961
Number of observations 35,352 35,352
Number of spells 7,635 7,635
Standard scores in parentheses (robust standard errors).
wc=white-collar, bc=blue-collar, s= service.
m=male, f=female, u=university, nu=no university.
Pseudo log-L: since obs are not independent (Sribney, 2005).14
change in the independent variables.9 The results indicate that wages sig-
ni¯cantly a®ect job duration. An increase in annual wages by SEK 1,000
implies that expected job duration in months increases by 0.74 percent.
Workers with a higher risk tend to stay shorter on a job, albeit this is not
signi¯cant at the 5 percent level. An increase in the accident rate by 1/1,000
employees will shorten expected duration by 0.18 percent. The other pa-
rameters are consistent with prior expectations. Workers in occupations
considered to have excess risk have shorter expected durations. In times
of high turnover, job durations are shorter. Workers with more work expe-
rience have longer job spells. Women have on average 6.76 percent longer
durations than men. Workplace size is important. Workers tend to stay
longer the larger is the workplace, possibly due to more opportunities for
advancement and versatility in work tasks that can be o®ered in larger or-
ganizations. Workers have on average the longest expected duration in the
¯rst job as indicated by the parameters for the job spell indicator variables.
Variables are allowed to a®ect ¾ in an attempt to control for het-
eroskedasticity. The parameter estimates for the skedastic function are
given in Table A-1 in the Appendix. To summarize, all of the continuous
variables and the job spell indicator variables were found to have signi¯cant
parameter estimates. Estimation results when variables are not allowed to
a®ect ¾ are given in Table A-2 in the Appendix.
The aggregated risk measure based on industry risk rates does not take
into account that the severity and type of prevalent injuries may di®er
across subgroups. The e®ects of wages and risk are in model II allowed to
vary across subgroups. The wages and risk variables are split into eight
separate variables, respectively. The e®ects may di®er across occupational
groups, between men and women, and between workers with and without
a university degree.
The estimation results, given in the second column of Table 3, indicate
9This is achieved by multiplying the parameter estimate by 100 for the continuous
variables and by multiplying by exp(¯) ¡ 1 by 100 for the indicator variables (Hardy,
1993).15
that the e®ect of wages on expected duration di®ers among the eight groups;
an F test for equality of the parameters of the eight wages variables was
rejected (Â2(7) = 33:11), indicating that the parameters are signi¯cantly
di®erent. Also, all wages parameters are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
The e®ect of wages on expected duration is largest for blue-collar workers
and males in service occupations. The estimates for these groups are about
twice the magnitude of that for white-collar workers with a university degree
(0.94-0.99 compared to 0.47-0.48). There are no signi¯cant di®erences in
estimates between males and females within occupational groups except for
workers in service occupations (Â2(1) = 3:89).
Accident risk signi¯cantly reduces expected duration only for blue-collar
workers and male service workers. The F test for the equality of the risk
parameters was rejected (Â2(7) = 17:42), indicating that the e®ect of risk on
expected duration is signi¯cantly di®erent across groups. Males in service
occupations have the largest reduction of expected duration, three times
the magnitude of that for males in blue-collar occupations. The di®erence
in risk parameter estimates between male and female blue-collar workers is
not signi¯cant (Â2(1) = 1:48).
The parameters for the indicator variables female and university degree
are now di®erent from the results in model I. Neither of them are signi¯cant
and the university degree parameter has the opposite sign. The parameters
for the remaining variables are similar to those of model I and will not be
elaborated upon.
The goodness of ¯t has been evaluated utilizing Cox-Snell residuals.10
Both models were considered to provide an adequate ¯t to the data. Also,
the possible presence of multicollinearity was considered. Estimation re-
sults were not altered by excluding variables that could be suspected to be
collinear.
Marginal willingness to pay estimates are obtained for both models
10The goodness of ¯t has been evaluated by plotting the transformed Cox-Snell resid-
uals ¡ln(1¡S(t)) against the expected exponential score (BrÄ annÄ as, 1992) for all uncen-
sored spells (Nelson, 2003).16
Table 4: MWP statistics
# of spells Mean St.dev. %-mean %-st.dev.
I: all 4,995 415 130 0.65 1.81
II: bc, m 1,128 695 201 0.93 1.58
II: bc, f 363 748 1 1.32 3.14
II: serv, m 232 1,703 200 4.10 19.38
bc=blue-collar, serv=service, m=male, f=female
Accidents: 1/1,000 employees.
Uncensored observations.
Calculated for the ¯nal year of each spell.
according to Eq. (9). Summary statistics are given in Table 4. In model
I, assuming homogenous preferences regarding wages and risk, the MWP
is on average SEK 415 when accidents are measured as 1/1,000 employees.
When allowing preferences to be heterogenous, MWP estimates range from
SEK 695 for blue-collar male workers to SEK 1,703 for males in service
occupations. This is more than three times the average MWP for model
I. The averages are signi¯cantly di®erent when performing pairwise two-
sample t tests.
The full densities of marginal willingness to pay estimates can be exam-
ined in Figure 3. The density for males in service occupations is, however,
only slightly overlapping with the densities of the other subgroups. A ma-
jority of male workers in service occupations have higher MWP estimates
than workers in the other subgroups. Kernel density estimates of the MWP
for model I only partly overlap the distributions for the three subgroups.
The densities for male and female blue-collar workers overlap, albeit the
density for females has less spread.
The MWP estimates are also calculated as percentages of annual wages
to get a perspective on the magnitude of the estimates. This also facilitates
comparison with estimates from other studies (see below). The mean per-
centages in Table 4 are signi¯cantly di®erent when evaluated by pairwise
two-sample t tests. Blue-collar workers are willing to forego on average
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Figure 3: Kernel density estimates of the MWP: by groups
Epanechnikov kernel, bandwidth=100. Uncensored obs.
of accidents by 1=1;000 workers. Male service workers are willing to forego
4.10 percent of their wages. The average for all workers based on model I
is 0.65 percent.
There are signi¯cant di®erences in MWP estimates across subgroups.
The results indicate that controlling for the severity and type of injuries is
important. The male service workers value safety higher than both other
subgroups although the average risk level is less than half (Table 5) (albeit
¯remen do have on of the highest risk rates, see Figure 2). Workplace
injuries encompass a whole range of di®erent types of injuries as brie°y
described in Section 3. Consider, i.e., injuries caused by kick or blow from
person or animal. The occupations represented in the male service subgroup
had a much higher percentage in 1981 compared to the overall percentage18
for the blue-collar subgroup (6.6 percent compared to 1 percent).11 This
type of injury could have more severe consequences for the injured worker.
It could also be that this type of injury is perceived as more risky. According
to Geller (2001), perceived rather than actual risk is important. Workplace
hazards that are considered as, catastrophic, uncontrollable, unusual, and
inconsequential are perceived as more dangerous than hazards which are
considered controllable, familiar, and understandable. It can be argued
that kick/blow injuries to a larger extent have the characteristics described
by Geller (2001) than some of other types of injuries.
The positive MWP estimates for female blue-collar workers are inter-
esting. Many earlier studies using hedonic wage equations have failed to
¯nd a signi¯cant e®ect of workplace risk on wages for women (Viscusi and
Aldy, 2003). One exception is Hersch (1998), who found that female work-
ers do value safety to the same magnitude as male workers (Viscusi and
Aldy, 2003). Here, female blue-collar workers value safety more than male
blue-collar workers on average.
Most earlier research concerning workplace safety and the monetary val-
uation of accident risk have estimated wage equations. Viscusi and Aldy
(2003) provide a comprehensive review of the research concerning the val-
uation of both fatal and nonfatal accidents. When comparing results, the
concept of the value of a statistical injury is used. The value of a statistical
injury (VSI) is the annual amount the average individual would be willing to
pay to reduce the number of accidents by one each year. The average MWP
of SEK 415 (Table 4) would then correspond to a VSI of SEK 415,000 (in
1991 SEK). The value of a statistical injury is then approximately 650 per-
cent of the annual average income in the present sample. The VSI values
reported by Viscusi and Aldy (2003) are mostly in the range USD 20,000-
USD 70,000 measured in 2000 USD. The average annual income of the
included studies are mostly in the range USD 20,000-USD 35,000.
11Typical male service occupations are ¯remen, police, and wardens in criminal and
psychiatric facilities. Blue-collar occupations are predominantly in manufacturing, con-
struction, and transportation.19
Table 5: Values of a Statistical Injury
Study Method Mean VSI VSI
risk (% of wages)
Biddle and Zarkin (1988) Wage eq. 37 USD 155,582 369
Viscusi and Moore (1987) Wage eq. 38 USD 70,650 162
Dorsey and Walzer (1983) Wage eq. 30 USD 60,581 280
Dorsey and Walzer (1983) Wage eq. 30 USD 69,235 320
Dale-Olsen (2006) Wage eq. 49 NOK 660,372 383
Dale-Olsen (2006) Duration 49 NOK 5,251,192 3,047
Dale-Olsen (2006) Duration 49 NOK 8,782,592 5,096
I: all Duration 27 SEK 415,000 650
II: bc, m Duration 48 SEK 695,000 930
II: bc, f Duration 38 SEK 748,000 1,320
II: serv, m Duration 16 SEK 1,703,000 4,100
Mean risk: the average number of accidents per 1,000 employees.
VSI(% of wages): the VSI divided by average annual wages times 100.
Dale-Olsen (2006) use risk imputed from certi¯ed accidents (¸ 3 lost workdays).
Three of the studies (Biddle and Zarkin, 1988; Viscusi and Moore, 1987;
Dorsey and Walzer, 1983) use a similar risk measure as the present study;
the rate of nonfatal accidents causing a loss of workdays. In Table 5, the
results of these three studies are summarized. The studies have VSI values
that are in the upper range of the results reviewed by Viscusi and Aldy
(2003). In order to make the results comparable, the VSI estimates reported
for each study have been recalculated as a percentage of wages12 for the
respective study (the rightmost column in Table 5). The higher VSI to
income for the present study could be evidence of the downward bias that
was pointed out by Hwang et al. (1992), that arise when human capital is
not fully observed in a hedonic wage equation model.
Also reported, are results from a Norwegian study by Dale-Olsen (2006),
who compares results using both a hedonic wage equation and a search
framework. The wage equation estimates from Dale-Olsen (2006) are also in
the upper range when compared to average wages. The VSI estimates from
the duration regressions are substantially higher, however. One explanation
12The same calculation is used by Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) to compare results
across studies. They call it the price expressed in years of wages.20
could be the di®erence in risk measures that is used compared to the other
studies in Table 5. Dale-Olsen (2006) use an imputed risk measure based on
physician certi¯ed injuries with at least three lost workdays. The average
risk is also higher.
6 Concluding Remarks
The results indicate that Swedish workers have substantial willingness to
pay for increased workplace safety. The willingness to pay to reduce the
number of accidents by one each year range from SEK 415,000 to SEK
1,703,000 (1991 prices).
The results con¯rm earlier research concerning the underestimation of
the MWP using hedonic wage equations. The MWP estimates here are
higher and in line with other studies using a job search framework. The
present study further indicate that using an aggregated risk measure, such
as industry risk rates, poses questions regarding the reliability of estimates,
especially when a wide group of workers is included. Allowing MWP esti-
mates to di®er across subgroups is important. An area for further research
is to extend the analysis by allowing preferences to vary over a wider range
of subgroups. With access to less aggregated data, interesting conclusions
regarding di®erences in workers' preferences could be reached. It would
also be interesting to analyze workers willingness to pay for speci¯c types
of injuries.21
References
Andersson, L., Gustafsson, O., and Lundberg, L. (2000). Structural change,
competition, and job turnover in swedish manufacturing, 1964-96. Review
of International Economics, 8:566{582.
Biddle, J. E. and Zarkin, G. A. (1988). Worker preferences and market com-
pensation for job risk. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 70:660{
667.
BrÄ annÄ as, K. (1992). Econometrics of the Accelerated Duration Model.
Umeº a Economic Studies, 269.
Cahuc, P. and Zylberberg, A. (2004). Labor economics. MIT Press.
Cleves, M. A., Gould, W. W., and Gutierrez, R. G. (2004). An Introduction
to Survival Analysis Using Stata. Stata Press.
Cox, C., Chu, H., Schneider, M. F., and Mu~ noz, A. (2007). Parametric
survival analysis and taxonomy of hazard functions for the generalized
gamma distribution. Statistics in Medicine, 26:4352{4374.
Dale-Olsen, H. (2006). Estimating workers marginal willingness to pay for
safety using linked employeremployee data. Economica, 73:99{127.
Dorsey, S. and Walzer, N. (1983). Workers' compensation, job hazards, and
wages. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 36:642{654.
Eckstein, Z. and van den Berg, G. J. (2007). Empirical labor search: A
survey. Journal of Econometrics, 136:531{564.
Garen, J. (1988). Compensating wage di®erentials and the endogeneity of
job riskiness. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 70:9{16.
Geller, E. S. (2001). The Psychology of Safety Handbook. CRC Press.
Greene, W. H. (2000). Econometric Analysis. Prentice-Hall, New Jersey.22
Gronberg, T. J. and Reed, W. R. (1984). Estimating workers' marginal
willingness to pay for job attributes using duration data. The Journal of
Human Resources, 29:911{931.
Hardy, M. A. (1993). Regression with Dummy Variables. Sage Publications.
Hersch, J. (1998). Compensating di®erentials for gender-speci¯c job injury
risks. American Economic Review, 88:598{607.
Hwang, H.-S., Reed, W. R., and Hubbard, C. (1992). Compensating wage
di®erentials and unobserved productivity. Journal of Political Economy,
100:835{858.
Jovanovich, B. (1984). Wages and turnover: A parametrization of the job
matching model. In Neumann, G. R. and Westergaard-Nielsen, N. C.,
editors, Studies in Labor Market Dynamics. Springer-Verlag.
Lancaster, T. (1990). The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge.
Malker, B. K. (1990). Yrkesrelaterade arbetsolycksfall: riskidenti¯ering
med hjÄ alp av ISA. In Arbete och hÄ alsa. National Institute of Occupational
Health.
Mortensen, D. T. (1986). Job search and labor market analysis. In Ashen-
felter, O. and Layard, R., editors, Handbook of Labor Economics. Elsevier
Science Publishers BV.
National Board of Occupational Safety and Health (2008). Occupational
accidents and work-related illnesses 2006.
Nelson, W. B. (2003). Applied Life Data Analysis. Wiley.
Rogerson, R., Shimer, R., and Wright, R. (2005). Search-theoretic models of
the labor market: A survey. Journal of Economic Literature, XLIII:959{
988.23
Sribney, W. (2005). Likelihood-ratio test after survey/robust ml estimation.
Stata Corporation (2003). Stata Reference Manual. Survival Analysis and
Epidemological Tables. Release 8.0. Stata Press.
van den Berg, G. J. (1990). Nonstationarity in job search theory. Review
of Economic Studies, 57:255{277.
van Ommeren, J., van den Berg, G. J., and Gorter, C. (2000). Estimating
the marginal willingness to pay for commuting. Journal of Regional
Science, 40:541{564.
Viscusi, W. K. (1992). Fatal Tradeo®s. Oxford University Press.
Viscusi, W. K. and Aldy, J. E. (2003). The value of a statistical life: A
critical review of market estimates throughout the world. The Journal
of Risk and Uncertainty, 27:5{76.
Viscusi, W. K. and Moore, M. J. (1987). Workers' compensation: Wage
e®ects, bene¯t inadequacies, and the value of health losses. The Review
of Economics and Statistics, 69:249{261.24
Appendix
The marginal willingness to pay in Eq. (3) for the generalized gamma





This is obtained by taking the quotient of the derivative of the transition
rate for each of the variables risk and wages. The transition rate for the
generalized gamma distribution can be written
r(¾)s(a) (A-2)
where r(¾) = j·j=¾t, s(a) = p(a)=q(a) (where p(a) = a·¡2
e¡a and q(a) =
R a
0 v(·¡2¡1)e¡v dv), and a = ·¡2(e¡¿t)·=¾. Then the derivative of the









and Eq. (A-1) immediately follows.
The marginal willingness to pay in Eq. (3) for the generalized gamma
distribution will, in the case where variables enter ¿ = xm




¾°risk + ·[·¡2 ¡ a ¡ s][(¡¿ + lnt)°risk + ¯risk]
¾°wages + ·[·¡2 ¡ a ¡ s][(¡¿ + lnt)°wages + ¯wages]
: (A-4)























and Eq. (A-4) follows after some calculations.Table A-1: Estimation results for the skedastic function (changes in ln ¾)
I II
ln ¾: Wages 0.001 (5.27)
ln ¾: Wages-wc, m, u 0.001 (1.55)
ln ¾: Wages-wc, m, nu 0.001 (1.58)
ln ¾: Wages-wc, f, u 0.000 (0.53)
ln ¾: Wages-wc, f, nu 0.001 (2.83)
ln ¾: Wages-bc, m 0.001 (4.53)
ln ¾: Wages-bc, f 0.001 (1.15)
ln ¾: Wages-s, m 0.002 (3.50)
ln ¾: Wages-s, f 0.000 (0.60)
ln ¾: Risk -0.001 (-2.11)
ln ¾: Risk-wc, m, u -0.004 (-1.02)
ln ¾: Risk-wc, m, nu 0.001 (0.52)
ln ¾: Risk-wc, f, u -0.005 (-0.67)
ln ¾: Risk-wc, f, nu -0.003 (-2.79)
ln ¾: Risk-bc, m -0.002 (-3.21)
ln ¾: Risk-bc, f 0.000 (-0.42)
ln ¾: Risk-s, m -0.004 (-1.22)
ln ¾: Risk-s, f 0.002 (1.08)
ln ¾: Turnover -0.020 (-2.34) -0.015 (-1.79)
ln ¾: Experience 0.028 (13.28) 0.028 (12.83)
ln ¾: Job spell 2 0.268 (6.50) 0.262 (6.34)
ln ¾: Job spell 3 0.301 (7.08) 0.296 (6.93)
ln ¾: Job spell 4 0.314 (7.03) 0.318 (7.09)
ln ¾: Job spell 5 0.258 (5.40) 0.260 (5.41)
ln ¾: Job spell 6 0.282 (5.27) 0.281 (5.23)
ln ¾: Job spell 7 0.329 (5.52) 0.338 (5.64)
ln ¾: Job spell 8 0.216 (4.18) 0.225 (4.34)
ln ¾: Constant -0.040 (-0.70) -0.047 (-0.81)
Standard scores in parentheses (robust standard errors).
wc=white-collar, bc=blue-collar, s= service.
m=male, f=female, u=university, nu=no university.
Pseudo log-L: since obs are not independent (Sribney, 2005).26
Table A-2: Estimation results (¾ constant, percentage changes in t)
I II
Wages 0.58 (13.83)
Wages-wc, m, u 0.33 (4.13)
Wages-wc, m, nu 0.55 (8.25)
Wages-wc, f, u 0.39 (3.10)
Wages-wc, f, nu 0.50 (6.94)
Wages-bc, m 0.82 (11.20)
Wages-bc, f 0.85 (7.20)
Wages-s, m 0.89 (6.60)
Wages-s, f 0.64 (7.41)
Risk -0.23 (-2.41)
Risk-wc, m, u 1.29 (2.15)
Risk-wc, m, nu -0.26 (-0.95)
Risk-wc, f, u 0.01 (0.02)
Risk-wc, f, nu 0.11 (0.48)
Risk-bc, m -0.43 (-2.98)
Risk-bc, f -0.75 (-3.21)
Risk-s, m -1.42 (-1.73)
Risk-s, f -0.34 (-0.76)
Turnover -11.13 (-6.95) -11.25 (-6.95)
Experience 7.99 (17.20) 7.96 (17.12)
Excess risk -4.95 (-1.29) -2.52 (-2.70)
Female 8.90 (1.91) 19.09 (1.42)
University degree -14.55 (-2.18) 9.36 (0.47)
Small workplace -12.84 (-3.00) -12.25 (-2.85)
Large Workplace 17.17 (3.40) 15.25 (3.07)
Job spell 2 27.94 (3.37) 27.06 (3.33)
Job spell 3 25.67 (2.93) 23.85 (3.79)
Job spell 4 3.48 (0.43) 2.09 (0.27)
Job spell 5 1.20 (0.14) -0.49 (-0.06)
Job spell 6 0.29 (0.03) -0.92 (-0.10)
Job spell 7 -7.25 (-0.71) -8.07 (-0.80)
Job spell 8 -34.71 (-5.49) -35.32 (-5.67)
Constant 2.99 (25.99) 2.97 (22.62)
ln ¾: Constant 0.35 (23.50) 0.35 (22.55)
· 0.17 (3.28) 0.19 (3.46)
log pseudo-L -10,427.43 -10,401.70
Number of observations 35,352 35,352
Number of spells 7,635 7,635
Standard scores in parentheses (robust standard errors).
wc=white-collar, bc=blue-collar, s=service.
m=male, f=female, u=university, nu=no university.
Pseudo log-L: since obs are not independent(Sribney, 2005).